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ABOLISHING MULTIPLE MAJORITY REFERENDUM
REQUIREMENTS: IS THIS THE CURE FOR
METROPOLITAN ILLS?
INTRODUCTION

Patterns of growth and change in metropolitan areas' during recent
decades have easily surpassed the ability of local governments to meet
the increasing demands for services made by area residents. Traditional
local governments were created to serve the needs of a different era and
have neither the power nor the fiscal resources to provide all the services
needed by metropolitan areas. Attempts to modernize local governments
through creation of centralized metropolitan governments with wide
ranging powers have met significant obstacles. State constitutional and
statutory requirements have been among some of the more formidable
barriers. These provisions require that a multiple or triple majority
of each of the local government units as a whole - city, town and
village - must be gained in a popular referendum before reform measures can be implemented. A recent case, Citizens for Community
Action at the Local Level, Inc. (CALL) v. Ghezzi 2 has challenged these
multiple majority requirements.
This article will explore recent trends in metropiltan area growth
and the structural problems of local governments in those areas. A discussion of the Ghezzi decision in the district court, including reasons for
its affirmation, will follow. Finally, an attempt will be made to analyze
the impact of abolishing multiple majority requirements upon metropolitan problems.
I. TiE

INTERRELATON BETWEEN METROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEMS
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

A. Trends in MetropolitanArea Development
There have been three major developments in metropolitan areas

which have caused the current failures in the provision of services by
1. Metropolitan

areas have been defined as heavily populated areas of land

made up of a central city and surrounding suburban regions, where there is a high
degree of economic and social interaction between the central and outlying sectors.
J. BOLLENS & H. SCHMIANDT, THE METROPOLIS 6 (1965). Further references to metro-

politan areas within this article will imply this definition.
2. 386 F. Supp. 1 (W.D.N.Y. 1974), appeal docketed sub nom. Town of Lockport
v. Citizens For Community Action at the Local Level, Inc., 43 U.S.L.W. 3614 (U. S.
May 3, 1975) (No. 74-1390).
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local governments. The first of these has been the considerable increase
in the population of metropolitan areas as a whole. According to 1970
census figures, most of the nation's 212 Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA's) 3 increased in size over their 1960 populations.
The Chicago SMSA, for example, increased 12.2%, Philadelphia 7.6%,
New York 7.8% and St. Louis 12.3%. 4 Such growth rates have followed
over a century of continued expansion and are predicted to culminate
in the year 2000 with 77% of the population of the continental United
5
States concentrated into 11% of its land area. Thus, the population
pressures which have strained local governments in recent years are
likely to grow worse in the next decades.
A steady decline in the "core city" population of most SMSA's,
with a parallel shift in population to outlying suburban areas, marks
the second influential trend. Despite the increases in the population
of the SMSA as a whole, the core city in the respective SMSA's has declined 5.2% in Chicago since 1960, 2.7% in Philadelphia, 1.1% in New
York and 17% in St. Louis. 6 More significant than the numbers themselves is the profile of those represented. It is the more affluent city
dwellers, industries and retail tradesmen who are leaving the core cities
and deserting poor and minority residents, whose tax dollars cannot
support the services they require The suburban exodus has not only
strained urban governments but suburban municipalities as well, which
3. A Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA)

is a region which contains

either one county, or a group of contiguous counties, with at least one city of 50,000

inhabitants or twin cities with combined populations totalling that amount. J. BOLLErNS &
H. SCHMANDT, supra note 1, at 7. Of the 212 SMSA's, 133 consisted of a single county,

39 of two counties, 22 of three counties and only 18 of more than three counties.

U. S. BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, STANDARD METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS (1961).
The implications of the lack of contiguity of SMSA's with county borders was discussed
in ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS [hereinafter cited as ACIR],
GOVERNMENTAL

STRUCTURE,

ORGANIZATION AND

PLANNING

IN METROPOLITAN

AREAS

12 (1961).
4. Frisken, The Metropolis and the Central City, 8 URBAN AFFAIRS Q. 395, 401
(1973).
5. J. PICKARD, DIMENSIONS OF METROPOLITANISM 22 (Urban Land Institute Research Monograph No. 14, 1967).
6. Frisken, supra note 4, at 401.
7. iMany of those who leave the city as residents still use the city's facilities gs
commuters, however. The drain that these commuters continue to place upon urban
facilities further depletes the city's resources. The influence of this drain can be clearly
seen by noting the inversely proportionate relationship between urban expenditures for
highways, which are extensively used by commuters, and population. In contrast, police,
fire and welfare expenditures in urban areas are higher than for all outlying regions. The
differences in expenditure levels between cities and suburbs are extensive, and suburban
areas have not contributed their fair share to cities through commuter taxes. ACIR,
METROPOLITAN SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DISPARITIES:
MENTAL RELATIONS IN CENTRAL CITIES AND SUBURBS

IMPLICATIONS FOR INTEROOVERN-

51 (1965).
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often become unduly reliant upon facilities supplied by private land
developers."
The final and most notable direction taken by metropolitan areas
has been toward an incredible proliferation of local governments, usually of a limited purpose variety. It is usually expected that the number
of local governments would increase in direct proportion to the size of
the SMSA. However, an examination of the larger SMSA's reveals no
such relationship. The Chicago SMSA contains an astounding 1060 local
governments, as compared with 963 in Philadelphia, 555 in New York
and 439 in St. Louis. 9 The main reason for this abundance lies in the
traditionally circumscribed territorial jurisdiction of the various levels
of local government and the equally limited powers these governments
possess. 10 Since no one governmental unit or level of government has
power over an area concomitant with the problems to be solved, new
governments are usually formed to solve the problems. An examination
of current local government structures and their powers, as well as the
methods by which their powers have been granted and interpreted, will
explain why this situation has developed.
B. Levels of Local Government
Local governments have been divided into general purpose and
limited purpose governments. General purpose governments are further divided into municipal corporations and incorporated areas, categories which, in states like New York, can overlap. In the past, only
cities, boroughs, towns and villages enjoyed the wider range of powers
8. This reliance has been particularly evident in water supply and waste disposal,
where local governments depend upon private wells and septic tanks, rather than providing public water and sewage systems. Likewise, local governments often provide
services only after a crisis. A typical example is land development where natural resources
are polluted and prime land, which could have been developed for civic purposes, is
taken by private developers before local government can act to acquire it. ACIR, METROPOLITAN AMERICA CHALLENGE TO FEDERALISM 3 (1966).
9. J. BOLLENS & H. SCHMANDT, supra note 1, at 144.
10. The powers granted to local governments and thus the type of local government
that develops, varies according to "geographic, economic, and social condition, and
special local interests." COMM. FOR ECONOMIC DEv., MODERNIZING LOCAL GOVERNMENT
TO SECURE A BALANCED FEDERALISM 24 (1966). Therefore, there are extensive regional
variations in the types of local governments which have evolved. Although limited space
does not permit extensive analysis of these regional differences and their implications,
some introduction to the variations at the outset of the discussion of local governments
is in order. The New England states, for example, have favored a "township" form of
government, and make extensive use of special districts, downplaying the role of county
government. There are no county governments, for example, in Connecticut and Rhode
Island. The Southern, Midwestern and Western states, in costrast, have made counties
the most important units of local government. Id. at 24-25.
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-afforded by their municipal corporation status.' Counties were purely
administrative, unincorporated arms of the state, performing only the
"state-directed functions [of judicial administration], custody and preservation of official documents, and assessment of property."'1 2 Today,
counties also enjoy the privileges of municipal corporations and exercise a wide variety of governmental functions. However, general purpose governments as a whole, even with the greater powers of municipal corporate status, have been unable to supply all the necessary services to local residents. Therefore, limited purpose governments or "special districts" have been formed to augment general purpose governments. Special districts are generally specially created units of government which are limited to the provision of one service. Many special
districts have the ability to tax and issue bonds to support the service
they provide but don't exercise power beyond the narrow sphere of oneservice or limited-service provision. The jurisdiction of special districts
extends over the boundaries of existing general purpose governments,
thereby tending to obscure the inability of those general purpose governments to provide the service.'8 Due to the fact that most of those administering special districts are politically appointed, rather than popularly elected like general government officials, local residents maintain
no control over the administration of some of the most vital services in
their communities. 14 Despite their numerous drawbacks, special districts have filled the gap of service provision that general purpose governments could not fill, and thereby have become the most numerous
kind of government currently existing in America. 1r
11. Id. at 25-28.
12. Id. at 28-29. For more extensive studies of county governments and their
emerging forms see ACIR, PROFILE OF COUNTY GOVERNMENT (1972); ACIR, FoR A
MORE PERFECT UNION-CouNTY REFORM (1971); J. BOLLENS, AMERICAN COUNTY
GOVERNMENT (1969); H. DUNCOMBE, COUNTY GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA (1966);
Jones, Gansel & Howe, County Government Organization and Services, in INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGEMENT AsSOCIATION, THE MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK 1972, at
211-38 (1972); S. TORRENCE, GRASS ROOTS GOVERNIIENT: THE COUNTY IN AMERICAN
PoLrIcs (1974).
13. The role of special districts in obscuring the failure of general purpose local
governments has been noted in studies of efforts to reform local government through
city-county consolidation. One study found that support of city-county consolidation
proposals was negatively correlated to the number of special districts in the areas involved. This indicates that so long as services are being provided in some fashion, voters
*do not examine the source or methods of provision. Marando, Voting in City-County
ConsolidationReferenda, 26 WESTERN POL. Q. 93 (1973).
14. Despite this accurate criticism, in certain limited situations special districts
have proven to be extremely effective. This effectiveness has been noted in the solution
-of areawide problems, such as transportation, through such organizations as the Port of
New York Authority and San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District.
15. Jones, Gansel & Howe, supranote 12, at 216.
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'Both general and limited purpose governments have been ineffective in solving the problems which metropiltan areas face. There are a
host of factors contributing to this inefficiency. First, most local governments are too small and contain too few people to effectuate meaningful changes. Further, popular control over the mechanisms of government is too insignificant to be effective, while governmental policymaking mechanisms are too weak to effectuate change without aid.'
Especially in the less developed areas, antiquated administrations of
generally unqualified personnel are the only staff available to institute
modernization. 17 Ironically, it is these individual political entities in
municipal government who are in the best position to change the current situation but are the most resistant to change.' 8 All cohesive regional planning efforts and "intrusions" by other levels of government
are viewed as threats to the individual dominions of power governed
by the smaller units of local government. Given this rather dismal picture, it is clear why the recent growth patterns in metropolitan areas
have pushed local governments to the point of almost total immobility
regarding service provision and other municipal functions.
C. Limitations on Local GovernmentalPower
There are two factors which have caused local government powers
to be so limited. The first has been the traditionally limited grants of
power by the state to local government, while the second stems from
the narrow judicial interpretation given to those grants of power. As to
the granting of powers, under the "State Supremacy Doctrine," all local
governments receive their powers from the state. This doctrine arises
from the fact that regulation of local government has always been one
of the "reserved" powers retained by the state under the tenth amend16. CoM. FOR ECONO Ic Dav., supra note 10, at 11, 13. Citizen participation
movements and attendant developments favoring advocacy planning have not solved
the problem of popular control and some sources claim these groups have furthered
fragmentation and other local government ills. D. HAGMAN, PUBLIC PLANNING AND
CONTROL OF URBAN AND LAND DEVELOPMENT 233 (1973). A fair appraisal of the effect
of citizen participation, in general, upon local government problems is that the most
effective movements are those like Citizens for Community Action at the Local Level
in the Ghezzi case, which emphasize structural reforms and not merely short-term
remedies.

17. COMM.

FOR

ECONOMIC DEv., supra note 10, at 13.

18. Municipal officeholders are not alone in their opposition to governmental reform
measures. In a study of a major governmental consolidation involving the city of Miami
and -the county of Dade, other organizations were found to oppose reform. Other opposition groups'included a county league of local municipalities, municipal chambers of
commerce, unions for municipal and county employees and a citizens committee of local
residents formed to oppose the planned change. E. SOFEN, THE MIAMI METROPOLITAN
EXPRmMENT 68-70 (Rev. ed. 1966).
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ment of the United States Constitution. 9 States have had the option,
therefore, of either granting local governments a wide range of authority or denying that authority. Traditionally, states have chosen the
latter option and local governments have languished with little real
control over their affairs. In recent times, states have begun to delegate
greater authority to local governments through grants of authority
termed "home rule provisions." Home rule provisions have either been
in the form of state constitutional amendments or acts of the state legislature. These provisions have either been self-implementing, going into
effect as soon as they're passed, direct grants by the legislature to the
local government or have required adoption of a local charter through
a popular referendum for implementation. 20
The second factor limiting the interpretation of the powers granted
local governments has been "Dillon's Rule." 21 Dillon's Rule states that
municipal corporations can only exercise powers which are expressly
granted to them, are clearly implied in the grant or are essential to the
purposes of the corporation.22 Where there is a question regarding the
existence of any municipal power, according to Dillon's Rule, the dispute must be resolved against the corporation. Dillion's Rule hampered the development of municipal governments for many years. Even
when home rule powers were granted to local governments, the grant
was narrowly construed. Although Dillion's Rule has been eroded in
recent times, it still operates in some instances to shackle the free and
full exercise of local governmental powers. Furthermore, even though
it is no longer a vital concept of judicial construction, it is only recent
home rule grants which have been free of its influence.
19. U. S. CONST. amend. X states, "The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
20. D. MANDELKER, MANAGING OUR URBAN ENVIRONMENT 39 (1963).
21. J. DILLON, 1 MUNcn'AL CORPORATIONS § 237(89), at 448-50 (5th ed. 1911).
"Dillon's Rule" states:
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation
possesses and can exercise the following powers, and no others: First, those
granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or
incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the corporation-not simply
convenient, but indispensable. Any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt concerning
the existence of power is resolved by the courts against the corporation, and the
power is denied.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
22. Id.
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D. Strengthening County Government
Due to the many problems which have strained local governments
in recent times, home rule provisions have been enacted in about half
of the states and the number is growing.2 The purpose of the original
grants of home rule power was to "free central cities who then controlled the major portions of the geographic area in metropolitan complexes," 24 and who needed greater control over the ever widening areas
they controlled.2 5 The era of extensive urban expansion ended in the
early part of the twentieth century and since then, the focus of home
rule provisions has been upon counties. Home rule provisions have
been used to free counties from their former position as merely administrative entities. These provisions have granted counties a fuller range
of powers and have permitted the transfer of functions from other local
governments to counties. Although states have varied in their approaches
to home rule, many have followed the pattern of New York and permit
either direct grants of home rule power or popular referendums on
local charters to implement home rule.26 Two major provisions in New
York, Article IX of the New York State Constitution2T and the Municipal Home Rule Law,28 allow counties to devise their own charters and
23. The importance of home rule in developing local governments has been noted in
T. MURPHY, METROPOLITICS AND THE URBAN COUNTY 26 (1970), where Murphy said:
The whole question of metropolitan organization is directly related to home
rule and state attitudes toward it. This has been a significant factor in the development of cities and of some of the adaptive techniques they have used to
handle the new challenges of concentrated urbanism in fragmented metropolitan
environments. The precedents set in this process are becoming increasingly
important for they are being applied to the powers of county governments.
24. MANDELKER, supra note,20, at 68.

25. These widening areas of control were due mainly to numerous annexations
by cities of the areas surrounding them. This annexation trend will be discussed infra
Part III.
26. Local charters have been, described as, "a series of compromises arrived at by
people of differing interests and concerns." A. WHITE, CHARTERS As MUNICIPAL CONSTITUTIONS 1 (Council of Planning Librarians Exchange Bibliography No. 477, 1973).
"Although certain structural, political and economic concepts are basic in all charters,
details are developed by local conditions at time charter is drafted." Id.
27. Article IX of the New York State Constitution was amended into its current
form in 1963. Section 1, entitled "Bill of Rights for Local Governments," enumerates a
series of grants to local governments including the right to a legislature; elect officials;
intergovernmental cooperation of local governments; eminent domain; apportion costs
of governmental services; amend county government if approved by a triple majority of
voters; and abolish or create elective offices. Section 2 directs the legislature to grant
local governments the necessary home rule powers while section 3 enumerates the powers
which are expressly retained by state legislatures.
28. N. Y. MuN. Hom. RULE LAW (McKinney 1969). Article 4 of the Municipal
Home Rule Law, entitled "Powers of Counties and Cities to Adopt Charters," describes
the County Charter Law in sections 30-35. In particular, section 33 requires a county
charter to set out the structure and functioning of the new county government, providing
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transfer functions from other units of local government to counties.2 9
Unfortunately, both of these provisions require that a majority be received in all the city, town and village units, each taken as a separate
entity, before a charter can be passed.
The trend toward strengthening county government, by transferring functions of other local governments to the county, has been seriously thwarted by these multiple majority requirements. In many instances, a county charter will be approved by the areas within the city
limits and defeated by the areas outside the city. Therefore, multiple
majority requirements have served to shield the political groups in
towns and villages who wish to protect their powers from the incursion
for an elected Board of Supervisors, the manner of election or appointment for county
officers and their terms of office and the other agencies and officers responsible for
performance of functions and duties of the county. The charter must also provide for the
equalization of real property taxes consistent with a legislative standard. Additionally,
the charter may provide for a county executive with a privilege of vetoing actions of the
Board of Supervisors, for the transfer of power between county and municipalities and
various other powers. Section 34 lists a rather extensive number of limitations and restrictions on the powers of counties to prepare, adopt and amend county charters and
charter laws. Limitations include provisions that the county charter cannot deal with:
taxation of state property; exemption from taxation; state aid; boundary units of local
government; compensation for judiciary members; composition, functions or jurisdiction
of a court; imposition, judicial review or distribution of taxes or benefit assessment; the
education system or a school district; required performance of functions at local expense;
functions performed and financed by the state and provisions contained in specified laws
of the state. Section 35 allows for liberal construction of the county charter law and
interpretation of unclear sections by the board of supervisors.
29. Almost half a century has passed between New York's initial grants of home
rule powers to cities and its current authorization for transfers of functions from other
local governments to counties. At the 1935 elections, a constitutional amendment was
first passed permitting counties outside New York City to alter their governmental structure. The amendment permitted the transfer of functions from other units of government
to counties and provided that counties could devise a method of selecting offices and
abolishing them and could exercise a variety of other powers. Nevertheless, the State
Constitutional Convention of 1938 amended the 1935 amendment. Whereas the 1935
amendment required that alternative forms of government be approved by a majority of
the total votes cast in (1) the county (2) every city containing more than 25% of the
population of the county and (3) that part of the county outside such cities, the 1938
amendment required approval of every unit affected, as a class. The stringent 1938
amendment was modified by popular vote in the 1958 election, whereby transfers of
local government functions to the county would become operative if approved by a
majority of the votes cast outside of cities and in the areas within the cities, each considered as one unit. If the transfer involved removing powers from village governments,
an additional majority of all the villages, taken as whole, was required. In 1965, Article
IX of the New York State Constitution (known as the Bill of Rights for Local Governments) was amended to its present form. The triple or multiple majority referendum requirements approved in the 1958 election were incorporated into N.Y. CONST.
art. IX, § 1 (h) 1. At the same time, the County Charter Law, (N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE
LAw §§ 30-35 (McKinney 1969)) was enacted, outlining the mechanics for the adoption
of county charters and requiring in section 33(7) the same multiple majority referendume requirements as section 1 (h) 1 of Article IX of the New York State Constitution.
STATE OF NEW YORx, TEmPoRARY STATE COIAM'N ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, LOCAL GOVERNMENT REPORT No. 13, at 23-24 (1967).
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of centralized county governments. Multiple majority requirements
have also served the interests of suburban and rural dwellers as a whole,
many of whom view the transfer of any local government powers with
great dismay. The source of their dissatisfaction springs from their perception that transfers of functions to the county are the first step toward
union with problem-ridden cities. Since so many suburban dwellers have
recently moved from the cities to the suburbs to avoid such urban ills,
they favor further autonomy rather than greater unity with urban
areas.30 Thus, both the suburban-rural political leaders and their local
constituents view the continued existence of multiple majority referendum requirements as vital to the continued existence of their local
governments.
Diametrically opposed to this suburban-rural coalition are reform
groups who are both civically and economically motivated. 31 These reformers regard multiple majority referendum requirements as the most
formidable obstacle blocking their efforts. Reformers who favor stronger
county governments lament that the continuation of mutiple majority
referendum requirements both protects and promotes the rampant isolationism of most suburban and rural areas. Fostering such isolationism
denigrates the many virtues that strengthened county governments have
to offer. Not only are county boundaries coterminous with many
metropolitan areawide problems and resources, but they have established contacts with state and federal funding sources for solution of
these problems.32 Strengthened county-wide government would also
eliminate duplicate efforts by local governments and could undertake
regional planning and capital improvements to solve metropolitan problems.83
In light of the pressures that have been building up between sub30. See 0. WILLIAMS, H. HERMAN, C. LIEBMAN & T. DYE, SUBURBAN DIFFERENCES
AND METROPOLITAN POLICIES (1965).
31. Civic minded reformers are usually groups such as areawide chambers of'
commerce, local newspapers, leagues of women voters and other like-minded civic organizations. These groups were involved in both the Miami-Dade consolidation and the
Nashville consolidation. D. BOOTH, METRopoLiTiCs: THE NASHVILLE CONSOLIDATION
19-20 (1963) ; E. SOFEN, supra note 18, at 34.
The more economically motivated reformers are those who identify with certain
economic interests which would tend to gain by governmental reform measures. In the
past, these economic groups have included industrial and real estate investors and developers, construction businesses, retail businesses and private transit companies. The
source of their interest is obvious, especially in light of the fact that land-use planning,
zoning, building regulations and transportation are important local government functions
which stand to be improved through reform measures. ACIR, supra note 3, at 10.
32. Note, The Urban County: A Study of New Approaches to Local Government
in Metropolitan Areas, 73 HAv. L. Rav. 526, 527 (1960).
33. Id.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

urban-rural local government interests and county-minded reformers,
it is no surprise that a challenge to the New York State multiple majority referendum requirements was recently brought in Citizens for
Community Action at the Local Level, Inc. (CALL) v. Ghezzi.3 4 Also,
it is not surprising that the two groups which are currently involved
in the Supreme Court challenge to the offending provisions represent
these two mutually exclusive groups.
II. ATTEMPTS TO ALLEVIATE METROPOLITAN PROBLEMS THROUGH
THE ABOLITION OF MULTIPLE MAJORITY RERERENDUM RE-QUIREMENTS

A. The Challenge to the New York State Multiple Majority Referendum Requirement: The NiagaraCounty CharterCase
Citizens for Community Action at the Local Level (CALL) v.
Ghezzi3 5 involved one of these reform-minded local citizen groups in
Niagara County and their attempts to formulate and obtain passage of
a county charter form of government in Niagara County. The situation
in Niagara County that prompted their efforts was very similar to that
in metropolitan areas throughout the nation. The Buffalo-Niagara Falls
metropolitan area, encompassing both Erie and Niagara Counties, had
experienced a 40% increase in population during the period between
1930 and 1960.36 During recent years the heaviest population growth
had occurred in the areas surrounding Niagara Counties' three cities.8 7
These outlying areas had been lightly settled and neither the county
government nor the twelve existing town governments were prepared
to provide the needed services for the newly concentrated population. 8
As one analysis of the area stated, "[t]he resources, the facilities, the
patterns of growth and the needs all overrun these old boundaries."""
Citizens For Community Action at the Local Level (hereinafter referred to as CALL) was a New York membership corporation dedicated
to amending the existing structure of county government in Niagara
County. They were convinced that current local government structures
34. 386 F. Supp. I (W.D.N.Y. 1974), appeal docketed sub nom. Town of Lockport v. Citizens For Community Action at the Local Level, Inc., 43 U.S.L.W. 3614
(U.S. May 3, 1975) (No. 74-1390).
35. Id.
36. Hyman, Reynolds & Stem, Government in Western New York, in Comat. ON
URBAN STUDIES AT STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT BUFFALO, URBAN
ACTERISTICS OF THE NIAGARA FRONTIER: AN INVENTORY 54 (1964).

37. Id.
38. Id. at 55.
39. Id.

CHAR-
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were inadequate to meet the challenge that population pressures in the
area presented. They were equally convinced that a county charter
form of government was the answer to the dilemma. Thus, a Niagara
County Charter was drafted by CALL and publicized through a media
campaign and a series of public meetings. The charter was approved by
the Niagara County Legislature by local law on September 6, 1972. The
charter created the elected position of county executiveo and extended
the term of office for county legislators from two to four years.4 1 More
importantly, the charter provided the county with the authority to
establish a tax rate, 42 and to adopt laws and procedures regarding the
equalization of assessements. 43 Additionally, the charter authorized the
election of a county comptroller,4 and permitted the county to maintain county property and roads 45 and administer mental and physical.
health programs.40 Public welfare, 47 drainage and refuse disposal 4s also
came under the auspices of the county government. These amendments
to the current structure of county government were received with extreme skepticism by residents and officials of the five villages and
twelve townships of the county. They viewed the charter as an usurpation of their autonomy which would be the first in a series of "trans-'
fers of function" 49 that would eventually lead to the collapse of town
and village governments. Further, the charter was viewed as permitting
greater autonomy to the county's three cities than to the smaller governmental units within the county.
The skepticism of the non-city dwellers of Niagara County was
manifested in the voter response to the charter in the November 7,
1972 referendum. Although the charter received an overall majority
of the votes cast (28,885 in favor; 26,508 opposed) it failed to carry the
area outside the cities by the constitutionally required majority. The
cities approved the measure (18,220 in favor; 14,914 opposed) but the
40. NAGARA COUNTY CHARTER art. III, § 301 (1972).
41. Id. art. II, § 201.
42. Id. art. VII, § 708.
43. Id. art VI, § 602(c).
44. Id. art. IV, § 401.
45. Id. art. VIII, § 802.
46. Id. art. XIII, § 1302 & art. XII, § 1202.
47. Id. art XI, § 1102.
48. Id. art. VIII, § 802.
49. There is a question as to whether the Niagara County Charter really provides
for the transfer of any functions from the local town and village governments to the
county. Although the state and the town in Ghezzi would argue that the charter provides for such a transfer, this really isn't the case. The charter does not "transfer" to
the county any powers that it didn't already have.
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suburban and rural areas defeated it (10,665 in favor; 11,594 opposed).50
Thus, despite the existence of the 2,375 vote plurality county-wide, the
charter was defeated by the 929 extra-city voters who resisted the change
that the charter represented to them."'
Due to the failure of the 1972 charter to receive the multiple majorities required, the State of New York refused to accept the charter
for filing when it was presented in December of 1972. Subsequently, an
action was commenced in federal court by the County of Niagara attacking the constitutionality of section 33(7) of the Municipal Home
Rule Law5 2 and Article IX, section 1(h) 1 of the New York State Constitution. 3 The complaint was dismissed 54 for failure to raise a substantial federal question on the basis of the court's determination that
the state was acting within its sovereign power and, therefore, was insulated from federal judicial review under Gomillion v. Lightfoot.,,
The action by CALL5 6 was brought in the same district court, but
50. Amended Complaint at 10, Citizens for Community Action at the Local Level v.
Ghezzi, 386 F. Supp. 1 (W.D.N.Y. 1974),
51. Id.
52. Section 33 (7) reads in pertinent part:
(7) A charter law
(a) providing a county charter....
(b) [s]hall conform to and be subject to consideration by the board of supervisors in accordance with the provisions of this chapter generally applicable
to the form of and action on proposed local laws by the board of supervisors. If
a county charter, or a charter law as described in this subdivision, is adopted by
the board of supervisors, it shall not become operative unless and until it is
approved at a general election or at a special election held in the county by
receiving a majority of the total votes cast thereon (a) in the area of the
county outside of cities and (b) in the area of the cities of the county, if any,
considered as one unit... .
N.Y. MuN. HomE RULE LAW § 37(7) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
53. This section provides:
Counties . . . shall be empowered . . . to adopt, amend or repeal alternative
forms of county government . . . . Any such form of government . . . may
transfer one or more functions or duties of the county or of the cities, towns,
villages, districts or other units of government wholly contained in such county
to each other or when authorized by the legislature of the state, or may abolish
one or more offices, departments, agencies or units of government provided,
however, that no such form or amendment . . . shall become effective unless
approved on a referendum by a majority of the votes cast thereon in the area
of the county outside of cities, and in the cities of the county, if any, considered
as one unit.
N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § l(h)(1).
54. County of Niagara v. New York, Civil No. 1972-656 (W.D.N.Y., filed April 3,

1973).
55. 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960).
.56. Joining Citizens for Community Action at the Local Level, Inc. lhereinaftei
cited as CALL] 'as a plaintiff in the action was Francis Shedd, a citizen of Niag-Aa
County who was suing on behalf of himself and all those whose votes had been impaired
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unlike the previous action, the plaintiff's request that a three judge
district court be convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C., sections 2281 and 2284,
was granted. The gravamen of CALL's complaint was that Article
IX, section l(h)l of the New York State Constitution and section 33(7)
of the Municipal Home Rule Law denied them equal protection of
the law by partitioning Niagara County into two separate voting units
of unequal population, one urban and the other extra-urban, and by
requiring separate majorities in each for the adoption of the county
charter form of government. 57 This distinction, they argued, created
arbitrary and irrational classifications based solely upon residence which
resulted in a constitutionally impermissible voting pattern. In order to
redress this grievance, plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment stating
that the challenged provisions were violative of the fourteenth amendment and, therefore, that the Niagara County Charter had been duly
adopted and was in full force. Further, an injunction was sought directing the implementation of the charter and the election of a county
executive and comptroller as provided in the charter.
Defendant argued that the action should be barred by the doctrine
of res judicata on the grounds that the prior action by the County of
Niagara was brought on behalf of plaintiffs here and raised the same
issues. Alternatively, relying upon Judge Henderson's decision in the
County of Niagara case, the state argued that the challenged statutory
and constitutional provisions were within the discretion of the state
and thus beyond judicial scrutiny. The state also asserted that a referendum on a charter need not comply with the one person-one vote
principle since it was not an election of a representative.
B. The District CourtDecision
Judge Timbers, writing the unanimous opinion for Judges Burke
and Curtin, granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, thereby
dismissing defendant's cross motion for summary judgment. Rejecting
in referendum voting on the Niagara County Charter by the challenged multiple majority provisions.
The defendants included John Ghezzi, Secretary of State of New York (John
Lomenzo was named in the original suit); Arthur Levitt, New York State Comptroller;

La Verne Grof, Clerk of the Niagara County Legislature and Kenneth Comerford,
Niagara County Clerk.

57. A state commission had suggested prior to the Ghezzi case that the multiple
majority referendum provision should be abolished. However, no legislative action was
ever taken on the proposal. STATE OF Naw YORx, TMPoRARY STATE COMM. ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra

note 29, at 43.
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the state's procedural claim first,5 8 the court held that collateral estoppel
could not be invoked in this case because the plaintiffs in this action
were not formal parties to the prior action and the county did not have
authority to sue on behalf of its citizens and voters.50 Also determinative in the defeat of the collateral estoppel claim was the fact that none
of the formal requisites for a true class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were met.6 0
The defense that the state has sovereignty in areas of developing
new forms of local govenrment and is therefore immune from judicial
scrutiny was dismissed as "wholly without merit."0 1 Relying upon
Gomillion, the court recognized "the sovereign right of a state to create
political subdivisions to assist it in carrying out state governmental
functions" 62 but held that this did not mandate that a state could exercise its sovereign right "so as to impair constitutionally protected rights
of its citizens."'6 3 Also cited as controlling were Gray v. Sanders,64 where
the Supreme Court held that once instituted, a state primary procedure
must give all participants an equal vote, and Avery v. Midland County,65
where population distortions in judicial election districts were overturned. Referring to the learning of these two cases, the court in
Ghezzi summarized:
[t]he State of New York, having chosen to create subordinate units of
government, is not immune from judicial scrutiny when confronted
with a claim that its exercise of sovereign power results in the imposition of unconstitutional conditions upon the voters of that political
subdivision. 66
58. The requisites for application of res judicata-a final judgment on the merits
in a prior action, identical issues in both actions and identical parties or privity of
parties in both actions-were set out by the Second Circuit in Kreager v. General Elec.
Co., 497 F.2d 468, 471-72 (2d Cir. 1974), quoting from Zdanok v. Glidden Co.,
327 F.2d 944, 955 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964), and were relied upon
by the Ghezzi court in making this determination.
59. CALL v. Ghezzi, 386 F. Supp. 1, 6 (W.D.N.Y. 1974).
60. Id. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) states that the prerequisites of a class action are:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties
on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of
the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
The court pointed out that the fairness requirement of (a) (4), in particular, would
not be served if the plaintiff's were not permitted to continue with their suit.
61. 386 F. Supp. at 7.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
65. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
66. 386 F. Supp. at 7.
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After subjecting the constitutional and statutory provisions in question to such judicial scrutiny, the court found that they were violative
of the one person-one vote doctrine. The state had conceded that this
doctrine would be violated by the multiple majority provisions in question if the provisions had been applied to the election of representatives.
The multiple majority referendum requirement in this case was immune from the Reynolds v. Sims 67 doctrine and its progeny equality
principle, according to the state, because no representatives were being
elected. The court cited the cases of City of Phoenix v. Kolodzieski, 8
Gordon v. Lance69 and Cipriano v. City of Houma,7 where no representatives were being elected and the one person-one vote principle was
71
applied, thereby dismissing the state's argument.
Similarly, the court disagreed with the state's contention that the
multiple majority requirement in question would fit under either of
the recent exceptions to the one person-one vote principle. Salyer Land
Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist.7 2 involved statutes which
limited the franchise with respect to water management and flood control to landowners in the affected district. The reasons for upholding
the restriction in Salyer were the "special limited purpose" of the water
storage district and the "disproportionate effect of its activities on landowners as a group."73 Since the county government established in the
Niagara County Charter was of a "general governmental nature" which
affected all the residents of Niagara County, Salyer was found not to
support defendant's position.
Gordon v. Lance,74 the other recent case in which an exception to
the one person-one vote principle was made, was also found not to be
controlling. In Gordon, West Virginia's statutory and constitutional
requirement that no political subdivision incur bonded indebtedness.
or raise taxes beyond a set figure, without a 60% majority of referendum votes, was upheld. Despite defendant's allegation to the contrary,
Judge Timbers found that Gordon differed from the instant case inthree respects: (1) the dual majority requirement in Ghezzi had a potential for unlimited dilution of the majority vote, while Gordon hada limited super majority requirement of 60%; (2) while the scheme in
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

377 U.S. 533 (1964).
399 U.S. 204 (1970).
403 U.S. 1 (1971).
395 U.S. 701 (1969).
386 F. Supp. at 8.
410 U.S. 719 (1973).
Id. at 728.
403 U.S. 1 (1971).
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Gordon was not discriminatory, the dual majority requirements in
Ghezzi diluted and debased the vote of the city dwellers of Niagara
County; (3) the Gordon court had specifically reaffirmed its prior position that any dilution of voting power because of group characteristics
that bore no relation to the interest of those groups in the subject matter of the election, was invalid.7 5 The restriction in Ghezzi is just such
a dilution due to a group characteristic-i.e., geographic location.
Therefore, finding no merit in any of the defenses offered by the state,
summary judgment was granted to the plaintiffs.76
C. Recent Developments
While the validity of the multiple majority referendum procedure
used for the 1972 charter referendum was being challenged in the
district court, another charter was being drafted for Niagara County.
A charter, similar to the 1972 charter, was formulated by a charter
revision committee and was adopted by the Niagara County Legislature on August 20, 1974. The 1974 charter varied from the 1972 charter
in that Article XIV of the 1972 charter entitled, "Department of Economic Development and Planning," was omitted and minor linguistic
changes were made. Further, the 1974 charter added Article IX entitled,
"Department of Parks and Recreation," and Article XIV, "Department for the Aging". The 1974 charter was submitted to the county
voters in a referendum on November 5, 1974. However, like the 1972
results, the required multiple majority of all the county residents outside the cities was not received. Subsequent to the 1974 referendum,
the district court rendered its decision invalidating New York's
multiple majority referendum requirements and on January 9, 1975,
granted an injunction declaring section 33(7) of the Municipal Home
Rule Law and Article IX, section 1(h)l of the New York State Constitution unconstitutional. The district court judgment also ordered the
state to accept the charter for filing and on February 28, 1975, the Secretary of State for New York complied with this order.
At this point in time, the litigants in the case were altered. The
change was initiated when the Attorney General for the State of New
York announced on February 13, 1975 that he would not take an appeal
to the Supreme Court in the case. Thereupon, on March 5, 1975, the
Town of Lockport in Niagara County and Floyd Snyder, the Town
Supervisor, were granted leave to intervene in the case on the ground
75. 386 F. Supp. at 9.
76. Id.
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that the potential effect of the 1972 charter on them would give
them an interest in the case. Because the state decided not to press an
appeal in this case, the court determined that the town's interests
could not be protected unless they were permitted to intervene and
appeal. However, although leave to intervene was granted at that time,
an application for a stay was denied. On the following day, March 6,
1975, an appeal was filed before the United States Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C., section 1253 and was docketed on May 5, 1975.
During the months after the district court decision and before
the Supreme Court's consideration of the acceptance of the appeal, a
state court proceeding was commenced. After being granted leave to
intervene by the district court, the Town of Lockport made applications
for stays to the district court, on March 5 and May 22, which were both
denied. Likewise, a motion to vacate the judgment was denied by the
district court on June 11, 1975. Thereafter, on June 27, 1975, the town
commenced an application for relief in New York State Supreme Court
pursuant to Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Laws and Rules
to revoke and rescind the Secretary of State's certification of the 1974
Niagara County Charter, on the grounds that the charter was not
adopted pursuant to existing New York law at the time. In the alternative, the town sought to stay the effective date for the 1974 charter's
implementation pending the outcome of the town's application to the
Supreme Court to hear the appeal involving the 1972 charter.
Judge Kuszynski, in his memorandum decision for the Supreme
Court of the County of Niagara, on July 31, 1975 denied both the
Article 78 petition and the application for a stay. The basis of the
denial of the Article 78 petition was the concurrence of the court with
the federal district court's position that Article IX, section 1(h)l of the
New York State Constitution and section 33(7) of the Municipal Home
Rule Law violated the equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution. The stay application was also denied on the grounds that
there could be no assurance that the case would be decided before the
1975 elections in November and to refuse to permit the implementation
of the 1974 charter would be to ignore the mandate given by the majority who had voted in its favor.
The state court judgment brought about a controversy as to
the mootness of the issue raised in the Supreme Court appeal. The town
filed a brief and other supporting papers to influence the Supreme
Court's decision to hear the appeal. They claimed that the 1972 charter
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was moot because the 1974 charter superseded the 1972, through section 101 of the 1974 charter, which states:
[t]his charter together with any and all amendments hereto, if any,
shall provide for and constitute the form of government for Niagara
County and shall supersede any and all other forms of Government for the County of Niagara, including any charter previously
adopted ....
Further, the town asserted that the 1974 charter was the only instrument defining local government in Niagara County. Thus, the town
argued that because the 1972 charter had been superseded and was inoperative, there was no live "case or controversey" worthy of the Supreme Court's review.
The essence of the CALL position on the mootness issue was that
so long as section 33(7) of the Municipal Home Rule Law and Article
IX, section 1(h)1 of the New York State Constitution were in force,
the controversy was a live one, regardless of which charter was at issue.
Thus the gravamen of the CALL argument was that the question is essentially a constitutional one. Further, the CALL brief emphasized that
the district court decision was so obviously correct that it should be affirmed without plenary consideration.
The Supreme Court entered a judgment in the case on October 6,
1975,77 vacating the district court judgment and remanding the case
for reconsideration in light of the new provisions in the Niagara County
Charter of 1974. The district court heard oral arguments in the case
during which time the plaintiffs made a motion to amend their complaint to include the Niagara County Charter and make the 1974
Charter part of the proceedings in the case. At that time, the plaintiff,
the New York State defendants and the Niagara County defendants all
agreed that the case was not moot and should be litigated in federal
court. The intervenor-defendant, Town of Lockport, in contrast, argued
that the case was moot because the 1974 Charter was certified, thereby
making the 1972 Charter and its validity no longer worthy of resolution.
The district court decided on October 23, 1975, that the case was not
moot as the problem presented was one which was capable of repetition
yet evading review. Further, the court found that certification did not
alter the nature of the controversy between the parties. Thus, the court
77. 44 U.S.L.W. 3198 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1975). On remand, the district court reconsidered the case in Citizens for Community Action at the Local Level, Inc. (CALL) v.
Ghezzi, Civil No. 1973-222 (W.D.N.Y., filed October 23, 1975) (with the Town of
Lockport intervening).
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reinstated its decision of January 9, 1975, as to the constitutional question, and amended that decision so that the 1974 Charter be considered
to be in full force and effect in Niagara County. Finally, the court enjoined the Town of Lockport from proceeding further in the state
court action. Although there has been no appeal filed in this case now,
it is likely that the Town of Lockport will appeal the case. It is possible
that the Supreme Court will determine that there is no live case or controversy in the case and that the issues raised in the district court in
Ghezzi are now moot. Even if the issues are not fully litigated again
in the Ghezzi context, it is likely that the same issues will arise again,
either in New York or one of the other states which have similar statutes
or constitutional provisions.
D. A Three Point Attack Upon Multiple Majority Referendum
Requirements
If an appeal is taken and the Supreme Court agrees to hear the
appeal in the Ghezzi case, it is likely that the Town of Lockport will
vigorously press many of the arguments presented less forcefully by
the state in the district court. Even if an appeal is not allowed there
are three possible arguments which could be made against the position
taken by the district court in Ghezzi. These arguments could also be
made in any case involving statutes or constitutional provisions similar
to those of New York State. All of these arguments, in the author's
opinion, could be successfully rebutted.
A primary and strong argument that could be made is that the
establishment of the structure of municipal governments is solely within
the province of the state and is, therefore, immune from federal judicial scrutiny. In support of this position it could be argued that the
fourteenth amendment has never been applied to such state procedures
before and was not designed to cover this area of exclusive state sovereignty. Further, it would be stressed that questions like these are
"political questions," and as such, are beyond the scope of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction.
Although this argument may appear to have merit, the Ghezzi
case is a logical extension of the Gomillion-Gray-Avery line of cases and
is thus dearly within the ambit of the Court's jurisdiction. In Gomillion, black citizens of Tuskegee, Alabama challenged the state legislature's gerrymandering attempts to disenfranchise them through alterations of the city's boundary lines. The court in Gomillion recognized
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the precedent of Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh78 and the breadth of the
state's power regarding municipal corporations. However, the court
also noted that it had "never acknowledged that the States have power
to do as they will with municipal corporations regardless of consequences" and went on to say that "P]egislative control of municipalities, no less than other state power, lies within the scope of relevant
limitations imposed by the United States Constitution."70 As was cited
in Ghezzi, the court held that only "[s]tate exercises [of] power wholly
within the domain of state interest," are federally protected, not exercises of state power used "as an instrument for circumventing a federally protected right."8 0
Similarly, Gray struck down Georgia's county-unit system of voting
in democratic senatorial primaries. The Court condemned in that case
a system whose end results were similar to those in Ghezzi, observing
that "Georgia gives every qualified voter one vote in a statewide election; but in counting those votes she employs the county unit system
which in end result weights the rural vote more heavily than the urban
vote and weights some small rural counties heavier than other larger
rural counties."' Finding state primaries an area of state concern, as
was redistricting in Gomillion or governmental reorganization in
Ghezzi, the Court could not sanction a system which denied the voters
of that state the equality mandated by the one person-one vote principle. Summarizing this sentiment, the court said "'we the people' under the Constitution visualizes no preferred class of voters but equality
among those who meet the basic qualifications."8' 2
Avery, along similar lines, overturned a Texas districting scheme
which permitted gross population disparities among judicial election
78. 207 U.S. 161 (1907). Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh involved a challenge by the
citizens of Allegheny, Pennsylvania to a merger with the city of Pittsburgh. The citizens
claimed that they had a contract with the municipality of Allegheny to be taxed only
for the governmental purposes of that city. Further, they claimed that the consolidation
deprived them of property without due process because the proposed consolidation would
probably raise their taxes. Dismissing their claims, the Court recognized that the state

was supreme in matters regarding municipal corporations and, therefore, the consolidation was well within their powers. The Court explained:
[A]lthough the inhabitants and property owners may by such changes suffer
inconvenience, and their property may be lessened in value by the burden of
increased taxation, or for any other reason, they have no right by contract or

otherwise in the unaltered or continued existence of the corporation or its powers,

and there is nothing in the Federal Constitution which protects them from these
injurious consequences.
Id. at 179.

79. 364 U.S. at 344-45.
80. Id. at 347.
81.
82.

372 U.S. at 379 (emphasis added).
Id. at 380.
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districts. This districting scheme, like the voting scheme in Gray,
heavily favored rural areas and was, therefore, found to be invidiously discriminatory and violative of the fourteenth amendment. Also,
as in Gomillion and Gray, the Court found that generally such matters regarding "the forms and functions of local government" are mat83
ters of state concern.
Reviewing the precedents of Gomillion, Gray, and Avery, it is
evident that Judge Timbers' decision that the state's multiple majority
requirements are subject to federal judicial scrutiny is a sound one.
These cases clearly prescribe that state actions regarding municipal
governmental organization which indiviously discriminate against one
group to the derogation of the federally protected rights of another
group, are subject to strict judicial scrutiny.
In the Ghezzi case, the New York multiple majority referendum
requirement operated such that, regardless of an overall majority of
votes cast in favor of a proposal, the failure of such a majority to accrue in all specified geographical areas as a whole-city, town and village-could defeat the measure. Such a plan, based upon an arbitrary
and irrational classification, functioned to invidiously discriminate
against all those voters residing in the area where the majority vote
was cast. This discrimination deprived all those residing in that area of
their fundamental right to have their vote counted and weighed
equally with all other votes cast in the referendum. Since the challenged provisions in Ghezzi operated in an invidiously discriminatory
fashion to deprive voters on the basis of an irrational classificationgeographic area-of their fundamental right to equality in the weight
of their vote, the Ghezzi case was clearly one that should have been
subject to strict federal scrutiny.
As a second argument, one might reiterate the state's contention in
the district court that the the one person-one vote rule should not be
extended to referenda on municipal changes. However, this position
seems untenable in light of the group of cases beginning with Kramer
v. Union School DistrictNo. 15,84 which invalidated a variety of municipal referenda on the grounds that they contravened the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Kramer, the first of these
cases, overturned section 2012 of the New York Education Law which
restricted otherwise qualified voters from participating in school district elections unless they either owned or leased realty in the area or
83. 390 U.S. at 480.
84. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
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were parents of school children enrolled in local schools. The Court
concluded at the outset that the provision should be subject to strict
scrutiny, "to determine whether each local resident has, as far as possible, an equal voice ....

-

, The state's argument that the franchise

was reasonably narrowed to those who were "primarily interested" in
school affairs was not found to satisfy the compelling state interest test
of the fourteenth amendment. The Court summarized that section
2012 was "not sufficiently tailored to limiting the franchise to those
'primarily interested' in school affairs to justify the denial of the
franchise .... "8 6
On the same day as Kramer, Ciprianov. Houma87 declared violative of the fourteenth amendment a statute similar to that in Kramer.
The Louisiana statute in Cipriano limited the franchise in municipal
utility bond elections to property taxpayers. As in Kramer, the Court
could find no "special interest" among property taxpayers justifying
their privileged status and noted that "[p]roperty owners, like nonproperty owners, use the utilities and pay the rates; [and] the impact
of the revenue bond issue on them is unconnected with their status as
property taxpayers."'88 In a subsequent case, City of Phoenix v. Kolodzieiski, 9 the Court invalidated a real property taxpayer limitation in
elections regarding the issuance of general obligation bonds to finance
municipal improvements. Again, the Court found "[t]he differences
between the interests of property owners and the interests of nonproperty owners are not sufficiently substantive to justify excluding the
90
latter from the franchise."
The most recent addition to this line of cases is Hill v. Stone.91
The Court in Hill nullified provisions of the Texas Constitution and
Election Code as well as the Fort Worth Charter, which limited the
franchise in municipal bond elections to property owners who "rendered," i.e., made available, their property for taxation. 92 The Court
found that the library bonds involved in the Fort Worth referendum
were not a matter of "special interest" to property owners who "rendered" their property for taxation. The Court concluded, therefore,
that there was no compelling state interest to justify limiting the franchise to rendering property owners.
85. Id. at 627.
86. Id. at 633.

87. 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
88. Id. at 705.

89. 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
90. Id. at 209.

91. 95 S. Ct. 1637 (1975).
92. Id. at 1643.
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In light of the extension of the one person-one- vote principle to
cover "general interest" municipal referenda in the Kramer, Cipriano,
City of Phoenix and Hill cases, the second argument has little merit.
However, if it was conceded that the one person-one vote principle
does apply to the Ghezzi situation, a third argument could be made.
The gist of the third argument would be that the Ghezzi case fits under
either the Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water District or the Gordon v.
Lance exception. As was discussed in Ghezzi, however, Salyer can be
distinguished factually from Ghezzi. Salyer involved the election of directors of a California water storage district, which had been formed
only to provide water to farmers in the Tulare Lake Basin and thus,
provided no other municipal services. Furthermore, all the costs of the
projects undertaken by the defendant water storage district were assessed against the land serviced by the district, in proportion to the
benefits received. The unusual limited purpose of the district was held
to warrant the challenged voting scheme whereby each voter was entitled to cast one vote for each $100 value of land and improvements
owned. The voting in Ghezzi involved, as Judge Timbers pointed out,
an all purpose local government. Hence it seems impossible to apply the
"limited purpose" exception of Salyer to the Ghezzi situation.
The situation in Gordon v. Lance, although clearly distinguished
from the case at bar by Judge Timbers' opinion in Ghezzi, arguably offers the defendant more room for a substantial defense. In Gordon,
Chief Justice Burger upheld a 60% "super majority" requirement in
referendums on general obligation municipal bonds and increased tax
levies. The decisions in Gray and Cipriano, which held that no dilution of voting power due to geographic location or property ownership
could be tolerated, were not viewed as controlling. Rather, it was noted
that no identifiable group was discriminated against in Gordon, unlike
the obviously racial classifications in Hunterv. Erickson.93 Absent such
93. 393 U.S. 385 (1969). Hunter v. Erickson involved a challenge by a Negr
citizen of Akron, Ohio to an amendment to the city charter which required a majority

referendum vote on any city council ordinance dealing with race, religion or ancestral
discrimination in housing before such ordinance could be exacted. Justice White in his.
majority opinion overturned the referendum requirement as violative of the fourteenth
amendment. In destroying the state's defense that it has to move more slowly in the
race relations area. Justice White hinted at the one person-one vote problems which
have been raised in the Ghezzi case:
[I]nsisting that a State may distribute legislative power as it desires and that the
people may retain for themselves ,the power over certain subjects may generally
be true, but these principles furnish no justification for a legislative structure
which otherwise would violate the Fourteenth Amendment .... The sovereignty
of the people is itself subject to those constitutional limitations which have
been duly adopted and remain unrepealed. Even though Akron might have
proceeded by majority vote at town meeting on all its municipal legislation, it

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

invidious discrimination, the Court voted that "there is nothing in the
language of the Constitution, our history, or our cases that requires that
a majority always prevail on every issue." 94
Since no invidious discrimination was present in Gordon, the state
was not required to meet a compelling state interest standard. Instead,
West Virginia had to meet the legitimate state interest or traditional
equal protection test by demonstrating that their "super majority" requirement was a rational one which furthered a proper governmental
purpose. The state in Gordon relied upon the long term implications
of incurring long term debts in justifying its 60% requirement. In approving this requirement as a rational one, the Chief Justice concluded "[i]t must be remembered that in voting to issue bonds voters
are committing, "inpart, the credit of infants and of generations yet
unborn, and some restriction on such commitment is not an unreasonable demand."9 5
The contention of the state in the district court in Ghezzi that the
long range consequences of the charter form of government fit the case
under the Gordon exception, was defeated by Judge Timbers, as was
the state's contention that the challenged provisions do not discriminate
against any identifiable class. The potential for unlimited discrimination, which obviously diluted the vote of those city dwellers in Niagara
County on the basis of their geographic location, was targeted as the
main reason for this failure. Despite this resounding defeat in the district court, it appears that further arguments under the Gordon guidelines might offer the only potential for relief for the town. Such argument would be composed of the two step process evident in Gordon.
The first step is establishing the fact that there was no invidious discrimination in the application of Article IX, section 1(h)l or section
33(7) to the Niagara County Charter case and, therefore, that the state
need only show a legitimate state interest. The second step is emphasizing the "town interest" in maintaining the current local government
structures in Niagara County.
Any attempt at establishing the fact that there was equality of treatment in the Ghezzi referendum, would have to prove that there was
none of the geographic discrimination found by the district court.
has instead chosen a more complex system. Having done so, the State may no
more disadvantage any particular group by making it more difficult to enact
legislation in its behalf than it may dilute any person's vote or give any group
a smaller representation than another of comparable size.
Id. at 392-93.

94. 403 U.S. at 6.
95. Id.
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This approach would stress that there was no deliberate attempt to
dilute the vote of any particular group, as was the case in Gomillion.
Further, it would be argued that there would be no predictable rural
bias as in Avery and Gray if a multiple majority requirement was continued because there could be an urban bias in some areas. Additionally,
it could be emphasized that each level of government-city, town, and
village-was given an equal chance to defeat a charter. The assertion
could also be made as it was in James v. Valtierra,98 that a neutral referendum requirement should not be struck down merely because it
sometimes operates to disadvantage the interests of a certain group.
Finally, it could be urged that geographic area is not a suspect classification such as race, religion or national origin and that therefore,
there is no reason to assume that the challenged system discriminates
on the basis of any suspect criteria.
Assuming the equal right of any geographic location in a county,
city, town or village to defeat a proposal which alters current governmental structures, Judge Timbers' geographically discriminatory argument seems weak. Further, since all members of all levels of government get to participate and exercise their "equal" right to veto any
proposal, it could be contended that the fundamental right to vote was
in fact not being diluted, as was contended by the appellees in the
lower court.
If the absence of such discrimination which would compel a strict
scrutiny test is acknowledged by the Court, then the only task for the
Town of Lockport is to show a rational purpose behind the multiple
majority referendum requirements. If the Court were to recognize that
the traditional equal protection test applies, it would not be very difficult for the town to meet the test as set out in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.97 of "some rational connection between the fact proved
and the ultimate fact presumed, [where] the inference of one fact
from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be a purely
arbitrary mandate." 98 The best purpose for the multiple majority pro96. 402 U.S. 137 (1971). James v. Valtierra involved article XXXIV of the California State Constitution, which required a majority referendum vote in a community
before any low rent housing project could be built there. The referendum requirement
was upheld in a majority opinion by Justice Black, as no invidious discrimination was
manifest by the statute's wording or its operation. Additional reasons for upholding the
requirement were that the state demonstrated a long history of using referenda for various purposes and also showed a legitimate state interest in allowing people to vote on
proposals which would place addidtional fiscal burdens upon them.
97. 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
98. Id. at 82, quoting from Mobile, J. & K.C.R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43
(1910).
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visions that could be asserted by the appellants would be the "town
interest" in maintaining the present governmental structures in Niagara County. The argument in favor of a "town interest" would be that
the state created multiple majority requirements to assure that all
changes in governmental structure have the support of all the levels of
government in the county which could be effected by such changes. In
developing the multiple majority requirement, the state recognized
that each level of local government as a whole-city, town or villagehas a special interest in seeing that all their needs are served by the
best governmental structure possible. The state also recognized in
providing for the multiple majority requirements that the governmental needs of each level of government may be different from the
needs of other levels of government and that these diverse needs must
be recognized. Finally, in granting local governments greater home rule
powers initially, the state recognized that each level of government in
the county had a unique group of functions. Therefore, it only allowed
for the transfer of functions with the condition that each unit would
have veto power over any plan that did not serve their best interests.
Although a rather strong argument could be presented in support
of this third argument, it is likely that Judge Timbers' decision in the
district court would be upheld. The one person-one vote principal
protects the fundamental right of individuals to have their vote free
from dilution. The argument of the "town interest" denies that the
right to vote is an individual right. In Ghezzi, it is clear that the individual's right has been fatally undermined by the recognition of this
fictional "town interest." To apply the lower standards of scrutiny applicable to the traditional equal protection test would be equivalent
to denying the right of the individual appellees to have their vote
weighed equally with those of other voters.
Even if the court were to recognize the existence of a "town interest," it would be very difficult to prove that implementation of the
Niagara County Charter damaged any "town interest." The charter
merely changed the names of many department heads and created several new positions. It did not really transfer any vital functions to the
county but merely reiterated many of the functions that were already
vested in the county government. The thrust of the complaints voiced
by those in opposition to the charter was mainly focused upon the
precedent that the charter set for the future increase of powers vested
in the county. However, the charter itself neither provided for any
meaningful transfer of functions to the county government, nor divested the towns of any substantial powers.
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Perhaps the main reason why this third argument would be defeated lies with the precedent set recently by the Supreme Court in
Hill v. Stone. 9 The Court in Hill defeated a requirement in the Texas
constitution and law that voters in municipal elections "render" their
property for taxation in order to have their vote count in municipal
bond elections. The "rendering" procedure used in all state bond elections was implemented through a "dual box" election procedure. The
procedure required that all those who rendered taxable property cast
their ballots in one box while all other voters cast their ballots in a
separate box. A bond issue was not considered to have passed unless it
was approved both by a majority of the renderers' box and an overall
majority. In Hill, a transportation bond proposal in Fort Worth, Texas
was approved through the usual procedure, while a library bond issue
was defeated because, although it received an overall majority, it was
not passed by a majority of the renderers' vote.
The Court began its examination of the challenged procedure by
stating that "as long as the election in question is not one of special
interest, any classification restricting the franchise on grounds other
than residence, age or citizenship cannot stand unless the districts or
State can demonstrate that the classification serves a compelling state
interest."'10 0 Initially, the Court defeated the state's contention that
municipal bond elections were special interest elections. Further, they
upset the state's alternative position that the "rendering" classification was a reasonable one, on the grounds that
our cases ... have not held or intimated that only property-based
classifications are suspect; in an election of general interest, restrictions on the franchise of any character must meet a stringent justification. The Texas scheme creates a classification based on rendering,
and it in effect disfranchises those who have not rendered their property for taxation in the year of the bond election. Mere reasonableness
not suffice to sustain the classification created in this
ill therefore
101
case.
Also, the Court questioned the state's position that the rendering requirement extended protection to property owners who bore the direct
fiscal burdens of the bond issue. This position was dismissed on the
grounds that not only taxpayers but all members of the community bore
the cost of the bond issue. Finally, the Court dismissed the state's argument that the "rendering" requirement encouraged people to pay their
99. 95 S. Ct. 1637 (1975).
100. Id. at 1642.
101. Id. at 1643.
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property taxes. In summary, the "rendering" referendum system was
overturned as none of the state's rationales for the distinctions met the
compelling state interest standard.
There are many similarities between Hill and Ghezzi which could
defeat the argument that the Ghezzi case should be an exception to the
one person-one vote principle. Primarily, the "dual box" voting procedure which was declared unconstitutional in Hill is very similar to the
multiple majority referendum requirement in Ghezzi. While the dual
box precedure necessitates a majority of the renderers and an overall
majority, the Ghezzi procedure entails a majority of the area within the
cities and a majority outside the cities, as well as an overall majority.
Also, the subject matter in both cases was of general interest to all
voters with no true relationship to the franchise distinctions. Likewise,
the voting distinctions in both cases were unrelated to the generally
acceptable distinctions of residence, age and citizenship. Thus, the state
defendants in both cases were under strict scrutiny to come up with a
justification for the distinctions, and were forced to meet a compelling
state interest standard. In both cases, it seems unlikely that the states
could present sufficient justification for their franchise classifications
to meet the test. Thus, it is logical that as the Hill procedure was found
to be violative of the fourteenth amendment, so too will the Ghezzi
multiple majority requirements be found unconstitutional. There
seems to be little hope, in light of the Hill precedent, that the Ghezzi
case will be presumed to form an exception to the one person-one vote
principle.
In summary, the district court in Ghezzi has set a meaningful precedent by invalidating the multiple majority referendum requirements
in the New York State Constitution and the New York Municipal
Home Rule Law. The wisdom of this position was recognized by the
New York State Supreme Court in denying the Article 78 petition by
the town. If the Supreme Court considers further appeals, or similar
issues are decided by another court, hopefuly the Court will recognize
the soundness of the position taken by the district court and decide
the case in a similar fashion.
III. THE IMPACr OF THE ABOLITION OF MULTIPLE MAJORITY
REFERENDUM REQUIREMENTS UPON METROPOLITAN PROBLEMS

A. The Effect on County CharterProposals
It is clear that if this decision were upheld, provisions requiring
multiple majorities of specified political subdivisions or geographic
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areas for county charter passage would be unconstitutional. Thus, the
New York requirement of a triple majority of the city, town and village
areas in order to institute a county charter form of government, as
well as similar provisions regarding county charters nationwide, would
be eliminated. Since county charters can provide for the transfer of
functions from other local governments to the county, eliminating
multiple majority referendum requirements would help the passage
of county charters. Also, passage of county charters in more metropolitan counties would thwart the interests of towns who view
strengthened county government as a threat to their autonomy.
However, there is a question whether county charters will really
serve the interests of the reform groups who have fought for their passage. Charters like the Niagara County Charter do not provide for any
meaningful "transfers of function" from the smaller governmental entities to the county. Rather, only minor changes were involved in the
Niagara County Charter. Nonetheless, if more county charters are
passed after the multiple majority referendum requirements are
dropped, the interests of reform groups in alleviating metropolitan
problems are likely to be served. Although county charters do not radically alter existing governmental structure, they provide a framework
for change. Despite the fact that no substantive functions are transferred initially, a conduit and a precedent for such transfers has been
established by the passage of the charter. Although the original charter in a county such as Niagara County did not make a significant
inroad into the problems of service provision -by local government, it
was a start. Perhaps subsequent transfers of function will create more
areawide planning facilities which could put greater efforts toward
creating a cohesive pattern of responsive governmental services. It is
this possibility - that such planning would undermine the existing
outmoded local government structures - that the appellants in the
Ghezzi case and their counterparts most fear.
Another source of worry for town and village governments and
their constituents is the likelihood that the abolition of multiple majority referendum requirements would be extended to other governmental referenda. An examination of other referenda in which a majority of the cities, towns and villages is separately required illustrates
why an extension of the abolition to cover these situations is feared.
B. The Effect on Other Local Governmental Reform Measures
Of the proposed reforms for local government structure, transfers
of functions through county charters is the least comprehensive. More

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

radical reform measures have included annexation, the federation approach, city-county separation and city-county consolidation. 1 2 Identical to the multiple majorities required for county charter passage, each
of these measures up until this time has required passage through a
majority of city, town and village voters, separately. However, if the
Supreme Court upholds the district court and decides that such multiple
majority requirements are violative of the one person-one vote principle, there is a very good chance that the abolition would extend beyond
county charter referenda. Nonetheless, it does not appear that any of the
governmental units involved in these reform measures could demonstrate a compelling state interest in maintaining the multiple majority
referendum requirement.
The first of these more extensive reform measures is annexation.
Annexation involves the absorption by the city of the areas surrounding
it. This approach was first extensively used during the period between
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century when the area sur102. These are the only reform measures which necessitate multiple majority referendum approval for passage and, therefore, are the only measures which warrant extensive textual discussion. However, several reform measures which have been proposed to
alleviate metropolitan problems are worthy of some mention. One method of reform
has been through the expansion of the authority of the cities to exercise power beyond
their territorial confines in order to reach certain problem areas. The method is used in
most cases for health care and nuisance abatement. Since the procedure doesn't include
zoning powers to eliminate the problem, it has limited applicability in most places.
ACIR, ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO GOVERNMENTAL REORGANIZATION IN METROPoLITAN AREAS 20-25 (1962).

Another reform measure has been the development of voluntary metropolitan councils of public officials to cooperate on areawide solutions. The growth of these councils
has been spurred by federal legislation which requires that such metropolitan councils
be created to disburse federal funds. Metropolitan councils have no independent operating capability without the presence of federal funds and usually work in a purely advisory capacity to local governments. They are, therefore, not particularly effective in
solving metropolitan problems but are used only in laying the groundwork for interlocal cooperation. Id. at 34-38; see ACIR, METROPOLITAN COUNCILS OP GOVERNMENTS
(1967); J. BOLLENS & H. SCHATANDT, supra note 1, at 371-99; Frisken, supra note 4, at
405.
Intergovernmental agreements for sale of services and jointly exercised powers
among local governments, another reform proposal, is the most widely used method of
increasing the scope and powers of local governments. This method, most often referred
to as the "Lakewood Plan," is used frequently in California. The plan originated there
when the city of Lakewood contracted with Los Angeles County to provide many of
its municipal services. The Lakewood Plan is thought to have a limited potential for the
solution of metropolitan problems, as it is feasible only where there is no conflict of interest between the participants, and when the particular function is suitable for such
contracting. ACIR, supra at 26-33.
All of these reform proposals have an advantage over those reforms listed in the
text because these reforms require no popular approval before implementation. However,
as was noted above, they also provide very limited solutions to metropolitan problems.
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10 3 Alrounding major cities was more sparsely settled than today.
though most of the annexations by major cities, especially in the Northeast, ended by 1930, a tremendous upsurge of annexation activity has
occurred in the smaller cities since the end of World War II, with
particular activity in the South and West. 0 4 Although some of these
annexations have been passed by multiple majorities in a popular
referendum, many states do not require a referendum for passage of
annexations. 05 Only those states which require multiple majorities for
annexation would, thus, be affected if these multiple requirements were
abolished. Those states might argue that a compelling reason for requiring such multiple majorities in referendum voting is the fact that
the individual units become totally merged through annexation. Further, where unincorporated areas are merged, it might be argued that
the residents of the unincorporated area are having a totally new government imposed upon them and, subsequently, have a right to have
their votes count as a "unit." Residents of unincorporated areas could
emphasize this reasoning, explaining that they are totally changing
the form of their local government which gives them a special interest
city voters in a referendum do not have. It is a dubious distinction of
interests made by those residents being annexed to the city and the
Court would probably recognize it as such. Despite the fact that residents of areas to be annexed have a stronger claim than those residents
in county charter cases, their interest does not reach the level of a
state interest justifying derogation of the fundamental
right to have all votes count equally.
4'compelling"

103. The first major annexation trend in the United States began with Philadelphia
in 1854. The trend continued with Boston in 1867, Chicago in 1889 and culminated in
1898 with the merger of over two million people from Brooklyn, Queens and Staten

Island into New York City. Smaller cities began annexing during the earlier decades
-of the twentieth century, including Cleveland, Detroit, Los Angeles, Pittsburgh and Cincinnati. Suburban areas surrounding these and other major cities began incorporating
to avoid annexation around this time, curtailing further annexation by major cities. Forstall, Annexations and Corporate Changes since the 1970 Census, in INTERNATIONAL
CITY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, THE MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK 1975, at 21 (1975).

104. With the exception of the Northeastern cities, almost every city of 10,000 and
many smaller places, have annexed significant amounts of surrounding territories. Between
1950 and 1970, of 177 cities of 50,000 or more in the South and West, only 6 didn't
make significant annexations. Id. The most dramatic overall expansion in area of cities,
mostly attributable to annexation, has occurred in the South where larger cities have

grown more than 1000% over the past 70 years. Id. at 29.
105. Other methods of annexation include legislative determination, home rule
.annexations initiated by the municipality itself, judicial determination through review
proceedings and quasi-legislatvie annexations made by a commission or board. F. SENGSTOCK, ANNEXATION: A SOLUTION TO THE METROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEM 9-41 (1960).
However, not all states which require a popular referendum for passage of annexations
require multiple majorities for passage. E.g., N.Y. CONST. art IX, § 1 (d) only requires
a simple majority.
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Abolition of multiple majority referendum requirements for annexations of cities would have a limited impact on metropolitan problems. Annexation tends to strengthen city governments by giving
them control over larger areas of land and in most cases does nothing
for counties. It is only feasible where metropolitan areas are not dense
and provides no remedy for heavily populated metropolitan areas. Thus,
eliminating multiple majority referendum requirements will only aid
the less populous metropolitan areas where annexation is still feasible
and multiple majorities through popular referendums are still required.
The federation, or "borough plan" approach to reforming metropolitan government holds more promise for solving metropolitan
problems and would be aided by abolition of multiple majority referendum requirements. Federation is a two level approach to local
government where areawide functions are performed by a large metropolitan government covering all of the local units, and local functions
are left to "boroughs," which are usually enlarged municipalities. 100
Federations have the advantage of providing a medium for areawide
provision of services as well as a milieu for more localized service provision through boroughs. Boroughs enable local towns and villages to
expand and provide the services which only require local control to be
effective. The federation approach has been used successfully in the
Canadian metropolitan areas of Toronto and Winnipeg but has not
been attempted in the United States. One governmental assessment of
the federation approach claimed that the requirement of multiple
majority referendum approval would seriously hamper its chances for
success in this country. 07 Thus, if multiple majorities are declared
unconstitutional when used for county charter passage, it is unlikely
that states would require them for federation approval. If federation
becomes a more popular concept in the United States and the approach
is attempted in some of the more populous metropolitan areas, an improvement in service provision and other metropolitan problems would
be likely to occur.
City-county separation is another infrequently used metropolitan
governmental reform measure that might be sparked by the abolition of
multiple majority referendum requirements. The process involves just
what its name implies and is usually coupled with an expansion of
106. ACIR,

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

To GOVERNMENTAL

REORGANIZATION IN

METROPOLITAN AREAS 74-75 (1962). The merger of Miami and Dade County in
Florida, discussed by E. SOrEN, supra note 18, is the closest reorganization in this country that has approached a "federation" model.

107. Id. at 94-95.
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city boundaries which allows the city to take over some of the county
functions.'," Baltimore, Denver, St. Louis and San Francisco used the
process in the latter half of the nineteenth century, but the approach
has not been tried successfully since that time. 1 9 The process has a
limited value for solving current metropolitan problems, and the
current trend is toward consolidation rather than separation. However,
if it were to be tried, a multiple majority referendum approval would
probably be required." 0 In those limited circumstances where such
separation would be practical, abolition of multiple majority referendum requirements, would undoubtedly aid the approach. Any
argument of "special interest" that could be made by either the city
or county, would probably be defeated as it was by the district court
in Ghezzi.
The greatest impact upon metropolitan problems could be felt
through the abolition of multiple majority referendum requirements
for passage of city-county consolidation proposals. There are three basic
kinds of city-county consolidation, ranging from the total merger of
all local government units into the county structure, to a substantial
merger of such units, to a partial consolidation which allows some of
the municipalities within the county borders to remain autonomous."'
Of the states that permit such consolidations, almost all require multiple majority referendum approval for passage." 2 The existence of this
requirement is largely responsible for the fact that up until 1973, although consolidation had been attempted twenty-four times, it had
been successful only in Baton Rouge, Nashville, Jacksonville, Columbus
and three Virginia areas." 3 The poor success rate of city-county consolidation attempts has discouraged many areas from attempting to
put such proposals on the ballot. Despite the reluctance to attempt to
institute such proposals, during the period from June 1971 through
February 1973, 256 city-county areas in 38 states were studying the
feasibility of consolidation proposals."
108.
109.
110.
111.

4

Id. at 68-71.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 71.

112. Some states, however, do not provide for a popular referendum at all in
order to pass a city-county consolidation. The Indianapolis-Indiana consolidation was
effectuated purely through an act of the legislature, as required by Indiana law.
113. Marando, supra note 13, at 90. Efforts which have failed include Kings
County-Seattle (1923); Cuyahoga County-Cleveland (1925); Multnomah-Portland,
Oregon (1927); Boston area (1931); Jackson County-Kansas City, Mo. (1933); Jefferson County-Birmingham (1936); and Jefferson County-Louisville, Wyandotte CountyKansas City, Kansas and Milwaukee County-Milwaukee in 1937.
114. The states included: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida,
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The reason for the great theoretical interest in city-county consolidation is the fact that it has been termed a panacea for metropolitan
ills. The city-county consolidation approach emphasizes a strengthened
county government, with a broad jurisdiction to solve the areawide
problems most local governments are too small to handle. The consolidated government would have the taxing power to finance and distribute areawide services more equitably than smaller units, as well as
the ability to plan for future provision of services. In many ways, county
charters are thought to be a first step toward such city-county consolidation measures. Just as the abolition of multiple majorities for passage
of county charters was fought by town and village interests, so too would
the abolition of such requirements for city-county consolidation be
resisted. But as no compelling interest could be found by the district
court in Ghezzi to uphold such requirements for county charters, no
compelling state interest could justify such requirements for citycounty consolidations.
C. Other FactorsAffecting Local Government Referenda
Even if multiple majority referendum requirements were eliminated, there is no guarantee that the future passage of city-county
consolidation proposals would be assured. Numerous studies of citycounty consolidation referenda have yielded a disparate group of variables affecting the outcomes of referenda. Although the studies have
been limited to city-county consolidation efforts, the same factors probably affect all metropolitan government referenda.
Initially, it has been found that consolidation efforts are more
successful in smaller, less developed metropolitan areas.115 Most successful consolidation attempts have not been in the major SMSA's of
the county and have been in areas like Miami-Dade, where almost
one-half of the population lived in thinly settled, unincorporated areas
at the time of consolidation.11 It has been hypothesized that smaller
metropolitan areas are more receptive to change because people are less
attached to any one existing political framework and none of the
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia and Washington, most
of which have loosened their constitutional and statutory restrictions on county home rule
and transfers of power in recent years.
115. See Lineberry, Reforming Metropolitan Governance: Requiem or Reality?,
58 GEo. L. J. 675 (1970).
116. Grant, The Metropolitan Government Approach: Should, Can, and Will It
Prevail?, 3 URBAN AFFARs Q. 103, 106 (1968).
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entrenched political power groups have been established to resist
117
change.
As of now, there is no clear evidence of a correlation between
socio-economic status and referendum voting on metropolitan government. Both affluent suburban dwellers and poor urban dwellers have
been known to vote against consolidation proposals. Political scientists
have attempted to establish a paradigm to predict voting patterns, but
with little success. "Ecological" theorists have claimed that the greater
the socio-economic diversity in an area, the less likely a consolidation
proposal will be passed."18 However, no pattern has been found to.
determine which socio-economic groups vote which way on consolidation proposals.
Studies of racial factors in consolidation voting have revealed more
illuminating results. Political scientists originally predicted that core
city minority groups would vote as a bloc in favor of consolidation
proposals. These theorists did not anticipate that core city minority
leaders would be generally opposed to reorganization of any type if it
threatens to dilute their power base in the inner city. Black leaders,
in particular, recognize that they can dominate a concentrated black
vote in an urban area, but cannot exert the same influence in a countywide predominantly white organization. In a study of the IndianapolisIndiana consolidation, it was remarked that most moves to unify'
government at best ignored blacks and at worst were motivated by
racist attitudes on the part of a monolithic white power structure. 119
It is clear, then, that the solid bloc of urban support counted on by
many political theorists for passage of consolidation and other reform
measures, cannot be guaranteed in areas where black cities are sur20
rounded by white suburbs.
117. Note, supra note 32, at 529.
118. Hawkins, A Note on Urban Political Structure, Environment, and Political
Integration, 2 POLnTY 32, 42 (1969).
119. Lugar, Decision-Making Allocation in Indianapolis, 1971 UTAH L. REv. 88.
The article was written by the mayor of Indianapolis who was a prime mover in the
Indianapolis-Marion County consolidation. An interesting aspect of the black view of
consolidation lies in the question of what black control of cities really means. One commentator has said that once blacks assume positions of power in municipal governments,
the white-rural-dominated state legislatures will be even less inclined to provide urban
areas with much needed resources. Friesma, Black Control of Central Cities: The Hollow
Prize, 35 J. Am. INSMTUTE PLANNERS 75 (1969).
However, the position of black leaders that retention of control of urban centers
is vital to their retention of political power bases has been supported by other observers. See Mogulof, The Metropolitan Governing Scene: The Stakes of the Big City and
Minority Leadership, 46 SocrAL SERVICE REP. 24-37 (1972).
120. The reason for black resistance to any municipal reform measure that would
alter boundary lines is that many such boundary changes are merely pretexts for dis-
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The reluctance found in black political leaders has also been noted
in traditional party leaders as a whole. Although civic reformers generally favor consolidation and other reform measures, Republican and
Democratic leadership often do not. In a study of the Indianapolis consolidation, local Democratic leaders were found to fear the possibility
that consolidation would weaken their political strength in the core
city and dilute the party's strength as a whole. 121 Rebublican officeholders, who it was initially thought would favor consolidation, feared
122
their positions would be lost when a new government was formed.
A similar feeling has been recognized to exist in many metropolitan
areas, especially in the North, where the city is traditionally Democratic
123
while the suburbs are Republican.
Another variable which has been found to effect consolidation
efforts has been the level of organization and methods employed by
reform groups. Media campaigns, in particular, have been found to be
very influential in the success or failure of metropolitan government
referenda. The importance of the media is in its outreach to the metropolitan populace. Most reform measures spring from an elite group and
have to be "sold" to the area citizenry. The failure of many city-county
consolidation measures has been attributed to the fact that most of the
campaigns have not reached out to the people, relying instead upon the
"logic" of the proposal to ordain its success.' 24 However, a successful
consolidation effort in Nashville demonstrated the validity of media
campaigns for metropolitan government referenda. In Nashville, excriminating against black voters. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C.

§

1973)

has been held to cover such boundary changes as annexation. Perkins v. Matthews, 400
U.S. 379 (1971). It has also given black voters a weapon with which to challenge potentially discriminatory changes. This Act was used to overturn an annexation scheme
in the City of Petersburg, Virginia which would increase the white population by onehalf and eliminate the black population majority, while retaining at-Large elections for
city councilmen. City of Petersburg v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1021 (D.D.C. 1972),
aff'd without opinion, 410 U.S. 962 (1973). In contrast, a recent challenge to an annexaation by the city of Richmond, Virginia which reduced the proportion of black residents
in the city from 52% to 42% was upheld because a ward system was introduced which
fairly represented the black voters in the enlarged community. City of Richmond v.
United States, 43 U.S.L.W. 4865 (U.S. June 24, 1975). Both of these cases indicate
that black citizens who wish to challenge any metropolitan reorganization attempts would
have the Voting Rights Act to support them. The cases also sound a warning for all
metropolitan reformers that their reform measures will have to reasonably represent
minorities in the new community in an equitable and nondiscriminatory way.
121. Cole & Caputo, Leadership Opposition to Consolidation, 8 URBAN AFFAmS Q.
253, 253-58 (1972).
122. Id.
123. Lineberry, supra note 115, at 692-93.
124. Marando & Whitley, City-County Consolidation:An Overview of Voter Re-'
sponse, 8 URBAN AFFAIRs Q. 181, 195 (1972).
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tensive telephone canvassing, door to door campaigning, public hearings and mass communications in newspaper, on radio and on television were responsible for the measure's successful passage. 12 5
A final, frequently discussed factor in all city-county consolidation
attempts has been suburban opposition to consolidation with cities. It
has been uniformly found that suburban voters turn out in larger
numbers than city dwellers for governmental referenda 26 and generally
vote against proposals for change.'2 7 The stronger the population
dominance of the city over the suburban areas, the less likely the outlying areas are to support moves for consolidation.128 However, suburban opposition to reform measures is not a fixed quantity and can be
1 29
influenced by the nature and extent of the reform proposal.
CONCLUSION

The precedent set by the Ghezzi case in striking down multiple
majority referendum requirements is undoubtedly a meaningful one.
Hopefully, the Supreme Court will consent to hear the appeal in the
case and will affirm. Nonetheless, it is dear that the abolition of multiple majority referendum requirements is not the cure-all for metropolitan ills. The problems of provision of services to metropolitan
areas have been developing over a number of years and will take an
equally long time to resolve. However, if the trend toward developing
increasing numbers of local governments to solve metropolitan problems can be halted, an important first step will be taken. Reform
measures, such as transfers of functions to county governments through
county charters, annexation, federation, city-county consolidation and
city-county separation may be able to halt the trend. However, these
reforms cannot be implemented in most cases so long as multiple
majorities in referendum voting are still required. Thus, abolition of
multiple majority requirements can provide the impetus for greater
utilization of reform measures, and may insure greater success for
these reforms.
But abolition of multiple majority referendum requirements
is just a start. The most significant effect of such abolition will be to
prevent suburban opposition in towns and villages from exercising
125. See D. BOOTH, supra note 31.

126. Marando & Whitley, supra note 124, at 187.
127. Id.; see T. MURPHY, supra note 23.
128. Marando, supra note 13, at 94.
129. .d. at 93.
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their long-standing veto power, a power disproportionate to their
numbers in the population. 13 0 Even after this disproportionate suburban control is eliminated, as long as there is a popular vote involved,
people will have to be convinced that a proposed reform measure is a
valid one.
Using city-county consolidation efforts for models, it appears that
popular referendums on metropolitan governmental reforms will still
be most successful in smaller, homogeneous areas, where the population has not become dominated by a proliferation of entrenched
political interests. Where the area is more developed and/or composed
of core central city minority groups and white majority suburbs, entrenched political leaders are likely to present formidable opposition.
Reform groups utilizing the more sophisticated media techniques
available to them will have to alert the population to the need for
reform, the inadequacies in the existing structures and the potential
for change inherent in the reform proposal. Special efforts will have
to be made to convince minority leaders and political party incumbents in both parties that the reform measures will permit just representation of all groups. If people can be convinced that the reform is a
needed one, then they will exercise their prerogative and approve
passage of the change. It is only after such overall approval is gained
that the effect of the abolition of multiple majority requirements will
be felt.
BARBARA M. RYNIKER
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